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1. Introduction 
 A stylized prediction of the development economics discourse is that informality will 
disappear with development.  Much of our analytical and policy discussion on informality is 
framed by an expectation of its imminent demise.  And yet in the last twenty years conventional 
measures of informality, far from declining, have either remained stagnant or have actually 
increased.  This includes countries like India where economic growth has been at historically 
high levels.  These trends led the OECD to ask in a recent publication:  “Is Informal Normal?”1 
Their answer was in the affirmative. 
 
 What exactly is informality and what are its magnitudes and trends?  What are the causes 
of informality and why is it not decreasing as predicted by standard theories of development? 
What are the consequences for inclusive economic growth of a large and increasing informal 
sector?  What are feasible and desirable policy responses to informality?  These are the questions 
which motivate this broad based overview of informality.  The questions will be addressed based 
on recent and ongoing research on India and globally. 
 
 The paper comprises six sections including this introduction.  Section 2 begins the 
analysis by considering the concept of informality, or rather the alternative conceptualizations of 
informality that abound in the literature.  This section will also summarize the latest empirical 
work on levels and trends in informality globally, including in India, paying particular attention 
to data and measurement difficulties.  It will establish the basic contention that informality, no 
matter how measured, is not on the decrease worldwide. 
 
 Why does informality exist?  And why is it increasing?  Section 3 develops a formal 
model to provide a framework in which to examine a range of hypotheses, from regulatory 
burden to technological change, focusing in particular on trying to understand why informality is 
increasing when development theory predicts that it should decline with growth and 
development.   Section 4 uses the framework of the model of Section 3 as an entry point to the 
debate on whether informality is bad for inclusive economic growth.  The consequences of 
informality for inclusion will also be assessed in this section, and it will be argued that research 
shows strong association between informality and poverty, especially of women.  
 
 Given the central role for policy towards informality in an inclusive growth strategy, 
what are the specifics of such a strategy?  Section 5 considers a range of policy interventions, 
including deregulation and addressing the low productivity of small scale production.  It will 
discuss in particular credit based interventions, for example encouraging or requiring formal 
sector banks to engage with informal enterprises, or supporting small scale financial institutions 
in the informal sector itself. 
 
 Finally, the concluding section 6 draws together the threads and summarizes the main 
findings and policy messages. 
  
                                                 
1 Jutting and de Laiglesia (2009). 
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2. Measurement 
   The discourse on “informality” and “formality” is an old one in development economics, 
and is closely linked to notions of “dualism” or “dualistic development.”  One cannot get very 
far in the study of development without encountering these terms.  And yet, as Guha-Khasnobis, 
Kanbur and Ostrom (2006) observe: 
 
 “Given the prominence of the formal-informal dichotomy in the development discourse, 
one might expect to see a clear definition of the concepts, consistently applied across the whole 
range of theoretical, empirical and policy analyses.  We find no such thing.  Instead, it turns out 
that formal and informal are better thought of as metaphors that conjure up a mental picture of 
whatever the user has in mind at that particular time.” (pp. 2-3). 
  
 Let us start with a brief historical excursion into thinking on formality and informality, 
beginning with discussions and debates in the context of dualism.  It is commonly acknowledged 
that the term dual economy was coined by the Dutch colonial administrator and academic Julius 
Herman Boeke in his writings on the Dutch East Indies as they were then, Indonesia as it is now 
(Boeke, 1949).  The dualism he wrote of was that between the “imported high capitalism” and 
the “native economy,” the argument being that modes of economic and social organization were 
very different between the two, and the former came into the ambit of formal colonial law and 
regulation, while the latter did not.  
 
For development economists the idea of dualism was crystallized by Arthur Lewis’s 
(1954) Nobel Prize winning articulation of a two-sector model of development in which one 
sector is “modern/capitalist” (“industrial”, “urban”, “formal”) and the other is “traditional” 
(“agricultural”, “rural”, “informal”).  The key difference is that enterprises in one sector 
maximize profits while in the other division of output is through traditional norms because in this 
latter case the marginal product of labor is zero (“surplus labor”).  However, as the modern 
sector grows through investment, more and more labor is sucked into this sector from the 
traditional sector—the natural trajectory is thus for the traditional (informal) sector to fall in size 
relative to the modern (formal) sector.  
 
Another notion of dualism, one that is related more to Boeke than to Lewis, is captured in 
the work of Keith Hart, the anthropologist who is credited with having coined the term 
“informal” in contradistinction to “formal” in his study of a slum area in Accra, the capital of 
Ghana in West Africa (Hart, 1973).  Here is how he describes his insight in a later retrospective 
(Hart, 2006): 
 
“Following Weber, I argued that the ability to stabilize economic activity within a 
bureaucratic form made returns more calculable and regular for the workers as well as their 
bosses. That stability was in turn guaranteed by the state’s laws, which only extended so far into 
the depths of Ghana’s economy.  “Formal” incomes came from regulated economic activities, 
and “informal” incomes, both legal and illegal, lay beyond the scope of regulation.” (p. 25) 
 
It should be striking how similar this conceptualization is to that of the distinction 
between the regulated realm of colonial activities and the unregulated realm of “native” 
enterprise in Boeke (1949).  This distinction between a regulated and an unregulated sector also 
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played a key role in the paper of Harris and Todaro (1970), which helped structure much of the 
analytical and policy discourse in development economics in the 1970s and 1980s, and which 
shows its influence even today.  In this model the economy is divided into a sector which has a 
minimum wage regulation, the formal sector, and another where there is no regulation so the 
wage is determined in a competitive labor market.  Here the size of the informal sector is closely 
related to the intensity of the regulation since it is the regulation which creates excess supply of 
labor in the formal sector which is then absorbed in the informal sector.  Thus in this model 
informality will decline with deregulation. 
 
The central idea in the above contributions is that “formality” is to do with an activity 
coming under the purview of the state, in the form of coming under the ambit of a law or a 
regulation, while informality is that which is outside this domain.  As Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur 
and Ostrom (2006) argue, this is the conceptualization that stands out as a common strand in a 
mass of literature that attempts different definitions, based on size of enterprise, degree of 
competition, coincidence of ownership and control, etc.  However, there are still a number of 
steps to go before the concept can be operationalized for statistical measurement using national 
data sources.  
 
An important issue is whether the perspective taken is that of the enterprise or that of the 
worker.  India’s National Commission on Employment in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) 
reflects the debate in distinguishing between the informal sector (consisting of enterprises) and 
informal employment (consisting of workers), drawing on the guidelines of the International 
Convention of Labour Statisticians (ICLS, 2003) but applying them to India’s specificities: 
 
“Informal Sector: ‘…..all unincorporated private enterprises owned by individuals or households 
engaged in the sale and production of goods and services operated on a proprietary or partnership 
basis and with less than ten total workers’. 
 
Informal worker/employment: ‘….those working in the [informal] sector or households, 
excluding regular workers with social security benefits provided by the employers and 
[including] the workers in the formal sector without any employment and social security benefits 
provided by the employers’. 
 
Informal economy:  The informal sector and its workers plus the informal workers in the formal 
sector constitute the informal economy.” (NCEUS, 2009, p. 3) 
 
 With these definitions, the NCEUS found that in 2004-05, out of a total employment of 
455.7 million workers in the Indian economy, 393.3 million were in the informal sector.  Further, 
of the 62.6 million workers in the formal sector, 28.9 million were informal workers according to 
the above definition.  Thus the informal sector employed 86.3% of all workers in India in 2004-
05, the figure being 92.3% for the informal economy.  The NCEUS also showed that these 
patterns had hardly budged since 1999-2000, the figures for that year being 86.1% for the 
informal sector and 91.5% for the informal economy.  If anything, then, there has been a slight 
increase in informality during this period of high growth in the Indian economy.  These broad 
trends in the Indian economy are confirmed by the independent work of Ghani, Kerr and 
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O’Connell (2013), who find that the employment share of the organized sector in Indian 
manufacturing has remained at around 81% between 1989 and 2005.2 
  
 When one moves across countries the institutional and legal framework changes and the 
specific statistical definition of formality and informality can also change, even when they derive 
from a common conceptual framework.  Thus, for example, although in India size of enterprise is 
a key aspect of defining informality, for Mexico the institutional legal structures are somewhat 
different.  As Levy (2008) clarifies, Articles 20 and 21 of the Federal Labor Law define the 
relationship between an employer and an employee (what is known as “subordinated work” in 
exchange for a wage, la relacion obrero-partonal in Spanish).  Articles 12 and 13 of the Social 
Security Law then specify the obligations of the employer towards the employee as defined in 
the Labor Law.  Notice that there is no reference to size of establishment.  Formality is defined 
by Levy (2008) as being those workers who are registered for social security—he estimates that 
in 2006 these workers constituted 38% of the work force.  Thus formality as measured is much 
higher than in India, but still below 50%. 
  
 Country specific studies can of course use country specific definitions of formality and 
informality.  But cross-country comparisons of level and trends need a more uniform statistical 
approach, as illustrated by the recent ILO-WIEGO (2013) publication.  A common feature of 
cross-country compilations is that agriculture is excluded, among the reasons being that “usual 
data collection systems do not often distinguish formal and informal (or modern and traditional) 
agriculture.” (Charmes, 2009, p. 32)  Despite comparability and other issues, such cross-country 
compilations give us a handle on the global picture in terms of levels and trends: 
 
“…on average, informal employment accounts for more than 47 per cent of total non-agricultural 
employment in West Asia and in North Africa, and more than 70 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, 
more than 50 per cent in Latin America, nearly 70 per cent in South and Southeast Asia and 24 
per cent in transition economies….Albeit not uniform, the data show an upward-oriented trend of 
informal employment in all regions.” (Charmes, 2009, p. 32) 
 
 The conclusion on trends needs to be treated with caution not only because of country 
specific variations but because different studies can produce different results as new and more 
recent data become available.  For example, the ILO-WIEGO (2013) study presents trends for 13 
countries over a five to ten year period.  While trends for Mexico (not much change in 
informality rates) and India (informality rates of around 85% up to 2011/12) are consistent with 
other studies, it finds declines in informality in several Latin American countries, and in South 
Africa.  However, we can safely say that the uniform and significant reduction predicted by 
development theory has not materialized, especially in a country like India.  
                                                 
2 There now appears to be broad consensus on these trends in Indian informality, in academic and in official 
circles—see for example Economic Survey of India 2013 (Government of India, 2013), Box 2.5. 
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3. Causes 
If formality and informality are to do with relationship of economic activity to state 
regulation and laws, then the causes of informality must be sought in the nature of these 
regulations relative to the structure of economic activity, and the evolution of both in relation to 
each other.  It will be helpful to set up a simple conceptual schema.  Imagine first of all a world 
without any laws or regulation.  There will then be a “natural” pattern of economic activity.  For 
example, there will be a size distribution of enterprises, from the very small to the very large, 
which is the outcome of economic forces untrammeled by state intervention.  Now let the state 
introduce a regulation affecting economic activity.  Conceptually this could be any sort of 
regulation, but to fix ideas suppose the regulation states that all enterprises employing more than 
a certain number of workers have to register with the authorities and have to in turn provide 
certain benefits to their workers.  Such “size-dependent regulation” is very common around the 
world. For example, India’s Factories Act (1948) requires such registration of all enterprises in 
manufacturing who use electricity and who employ 10 or more workers (20 or more workers if 
they use electricity). 
 
The basic ideas can be developed with a simple model.3  Let output ݕ be given by   
 
ݕ ൌ ݈ܽ െ ൬12൰ ܾ݈
ଶ 
 
where ݈ is labor andܽ and ܾ are production parameters.  We will focus particularly on ܽ as a 
productivity parameter.  If the wage is ݓ then profit is  
 
ߨ ൌ 	݈ܽ െ ൬12൰ ܾ݈
ଶ െ ݓ݈ 
 
The unconstrained profit maximizing choice of ݈ and the maximized profit  ߨ	 are given 
respectively by: 
 
݈ ൌ 	 ሺܽ െ ݓሻ ܾ⁄  
ߨ ൌ 	 ሺܽ െ ݓሻଶ 2ܾ⁄  
 
Thus for the optimal unconstrained firm, size and profit increases with productivity a. 
 
Now suppose that there is a regulation which bites at ݈ ൐ 	 መ݈, and the effect of the 
regulation is to introduce a fixed cost c.  This regulation is clearly irrelevant for ܽ	 ൑ 	 ොܽଵ 	ൌ 	ܾ ൅
ݓመ݈. For those with ܽ	 ൐ 		 ොܽଵ  the choice is between complying, not complying, or adjusting out of 
the regulation by keeping employment at መ݈.  If the firm complies, employment and profit are 
given by is given by: 
 
                                                 
3 A more general formulation is presented in Chatterjee and Kanbur (2013); a related model focusing on taxation 
and informality is presented in Kanbur and Keen (2014).  There are now many such models, of different degrees of 
sophistication—for example, de Paula and Scheinkman (2007), Gourio and Roys (2012) and Garicano, Le Large and 
Van Reenen (2013).  But all models recognize their debt to the initial formulation by Lucas (1978). 
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݈஺ ൌ 	 ሺܽ െ ݓሻ ܾ⁄  ߨ஺ ൌ 		 ሾሺܽ െ ݓሻଶ 2ܾ⁄ ሿ െ 	ܿ 
 
Suppose that if the firm does not comply there is a probability ݌	of getting caught and, if 
caught, there is a fine of ݂ per worker employed. Then employment and profits are given by: 
 
݈஻ ൌ 	 ሺܽ െ ݓ െ ݌݂ሻ ܾ⁄  ߨ஻ ൌ 		 ሾሺܽ െ ݓ െ ݌݂ሻଶ 2ܾሿ⁄ െ 	݌ܿ 
 
If instead a firm chooses to stay at an employment level of መ݈ its employment and profit is: 
 
݈஼ ൌ 	 መ݈ 
ߨ஼ ൌ 	ܽ መ݈ െ ൬12൰ ܾመ݈
ଶ െ ݓመ݈ 
 
Finally, returning to those with ܽ	 ൑ 	 ොܽଵ 	ൌ 	ܾ ൅ ݓመ݈, since they are outside the regulatory 
net their employment and profits are given by the unconstrained values for this range: 
 
݈஽ ൌ 	 ሺܽ െ ݓሻ ܾ⁄  ߨ஽ ൌ 	 ሺܽ െ ݓሻଶ 2ܾ⁄  
  
 A firm with ܽ	 ൐ 	 ොܽଵ	 compares profit in the three regimes to decide which regime to be 
in—comply, evade, or avoid. It can then be shown that there exist values of ܽ,   ොܽଵ 	൏ 	 ොܽଶ 	൏ 	 ොܽଷ, 
such that4  
  ොܽଵ 	൏ ܽ ൏ 	 ොܽଶ 	⇒ 	ߨ஼ 	൐ 	ߨ஻ 	൐ 	ߨ஺	 ොܽଶ 	൏ ܽ ൏ 	 ොܽଷ 	⇒ 	ߨ஻ 	൐ 	ߨ஼ 	൐ 	ߨ஺ ොܽଷ 	൏ ܽ		 ⇒ 	ߨ஺ 	൐ 	ߨ஻ 	൐ 	ߨ஼ 
 
To these regimes is to be added the category of those who do not come under the regulation at 
all—in other words, those with ܽ	 ൑ 	 ොܽଵ 	ൌ 	ܾ ൅ ݓመ݈.	 These might be termed the outsiders, with 
profits denoted ߨ஽	.	The values of ොܽଵ 	൏ 	 ොܽଶ 	൏ 	 ොܽଷ are defined by the following equations: 
 
 መ݈ ൌ 	 ሺ ොܽଵ െ ܾሻ ݓ⁄    
 ߨ஼ሺ	 ොܽଶሻ 	ൌ 	ߨ஻ሺ ොܽଶሻ      ߨ஻ሺ ොܽଷሻ 	ൌ 	ߨ஺ ( ොܽଷሻ 
 
The introduction of regulation thus creates four categories of enterprises: 
  
A. Those who are covered by the regulation and comply.  For example, in the case of 
India’s Factories Act, enterprises with 10 or more workers which register. 
B. Those who are covered by the regulation but do not comply.  This is, quite simply, 
illegality—an enterprise with 10 workers or more which does not register. 
                                                 
4 This will hold for ݌	ܽ݊݀	݂ small enough. 
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C. Those who adjust out of the coverage of the regulation.  This would be an enterprise 
whose “natural” size would be 12 workers, say, but which chooses to stay at 9 
workers to avoid registration costs.  These enterprises have reacted perfectly legally 
to the regulation. 
D. Those who are outside the coverage of the regulation.  These would be enterprises 
whose “natural” size would be less than 10 workers. 
The above categorization can be used to address a number of issues in the causal factors 
behind informality.  If formal is defined as being covered by regulation and complying, category 
A is formal.  Then if informality is the complement of formality, B + C + D is informal.  Indeed 
this is how informality is often measured from national statistical sources.  But it is immediately 
clear that informality is itself composed of different sub-categories, with very different economic 
causes (and consequences).  Category B would not exist if enforcement of the regulation were 
perfect. Its size depends on the nature of the enforcement regime.  Category C is one which 
worries many economists as representing the distortionary costs of the regulation—in the 
example of size-dependent regulation, these enterprises would be larger and would employ more 
workers in the absence of regulation.  Category D is outside the regulatory net altogether, but is 
the special worry of many civil society organizations, which see low productivity and low 
incomes in these very small scale enterprises as a major barrier to inclusive growth. 
 
Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of the causes of informality, let us put some 
empirical flesh on this theoretical skeleton.  How big are the different categories A, B, C, D?  We 
can answer this question for the case of India’s Factories Act, the law we have been using as an 
example throughout the theoretical development.  We draw on the work of Chatterjee and 
Kanbur (2013).  India’s Factories Act (1948) applies to manufacturing and requires registration 
of all enterprises with 10 or more workers if they use electricity, and 20 or more workers if they 
do not.  Chatterjee and Kanbur (2013) argue that the second requirement has become 
increasingly irrelevant since there are fewer and fewer establishments that employ 10 workers or 
more but do not use electricity.  We follow them in focusing on the “10 or more workers” 
criterion (they show that the patterns are not much affected using the broader criterion).  
 
Registered enterprises comprise the “organized sector” in official terminology, or the 
formal sector in terms of the development economics discourse.  This is our category A above—
those who come within the ambit of the state and comply with the defining regulation.  Thus all 
unregistered enterprises would constitute informality, B+C+D.  But what about categories B, C 
and D taken separately?  How do we get an estimate of the number of enterprises and the 
employment in each of these categories?  Registered enterprises are surveyed every year under 
the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI).  But every five years the National Sample Survey 
Organisation (NSSO) conducts a survey precisely of those enterprises which are not registered 
under the Factories Act.  It collects a large amount of information on these enterprises, including 
employment. 
 
Clearly, those enterprises in the NSSO quinquennial survey of unregistered 
manufacturing enterprises that have 10 or more workers belong to category B—they should be 
registered but are not.  What about category C? This presents a difficulty because it involves a 
counterfactual.  Among the enterprises in the NSSO survey with less than 10 workers, we have 
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to identify those whose “natural” size is 10 workers or more and those whose natural size is less 
than 9 workers or less.  Specifying the counterfactual will always be controversial, but the theory 
developed above gives us a way of bounding the size of category C. The theory says that those 
who adjust out of the regulation will place themselves just at the boundary where the regulation 
bites—any further would lose profit for no good reason.  In the context of India’s Factories Act, 
this boundary is 9 workers.  Thus if we include all 9 worker enterprises in the NSSO in category 
C, this will give us an overestimate of C, since some of these might be those whose natural size 
is 9 workers.  While a tight estimate would be best, for our purposes this overestimate will 
suffice. Then enterprises with 8 workers or less provide an underestimate of category D. 
 
With this background, Table 1 below provides the Chatterjee and Kanbur (2013) 
estimates for a range of characteristics of categories A, B, C and D for India’s manufacturing 
sector, combining the ASI for 2009-10 and the NSSO for 2010-11.  Several aspects of formality 
and informality are clear from the Table.  First, as is already well known, informality in India is 
very large.  Only 0.8% of enterprises in manufacturing are formal (A), and they employ 24.8% of 
workers.  The informal sector in manufacturing, comprising categories B, C and D, have a 75.2% 
share of employment and 99.2% share of enterprises in manufacturing.  Formal enterprises are 
larger than informal enterprises, and are more productive, which also confirms existing 
understandings.  
 
What is new in Table 1 relative to the literature is a disaggregation of informality into 
categories B, C, D.  Within the informal sector, category D totally dominates.  The “outsiders”, 
those who are not affected by the Factories Act because their natural size is below the size at 
which the law bites, account for 97.3% of all enterprises, and 64.1% of all employment. 
Category C, those who are adjusting out of the Factories Act, accounts for only 0.4% of all 
enterprises and 1.3% of all employment—and, as noted above, these are overestimates.  More 
significant is category B, those who are evading the Factories Act.  This constitutes 1.5% of all 
enterprises and 9.8% of all employment. Comparing this with category A, it would appear that 
almost twice as many enterprises are non-compliant as are compliant with the Factories Act. 
With almost 10% of all employment in category B, this is a significant type of informality; much 
more so, it would seem on the basis of these empirical patterns, than category C. 
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 With this empirical background, let us return to the theory model to identify some of the 
key causes of informality, taking the parameters of the model one at a time.  The size distribution 
of	ܽ, enterprise productivity, is a key determinant of the size of B+C+D, and of B, C and D 
separately.  A large proportion of enterprises with ܽ	 ൑ 	 ොܽଵ will lead to a large informal sector.  
In Indian manufacturing this number is 97.3%. 
 
 Consider now another parameter which one can take as a feature of the general level of 
the development of the economy, the wage ݓ.  An increase in the wage will increase ොܽଷ and thus 
decreases A and increase B+C+D.  Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, a higher wage economy 
will lead to a higher level of informality as measured.  But the logic is quite clear from the 
model.  The balance between complying and not complying with the regulation is tilted in favor 
of not complying when the wage is higher.  The composition of informality is also in general 
changed by an increase in the wage.  An increase in ݓ increases ොܽଵ and thus D.  However, the 
change in the size of B and C remains ambiguous. 
 
A third parameter which we can interpret as reflecting conditions in the national and 
global economy generally is the technology parameter	ܾ, which determines the optimal 
unconstrained size of the enterprise.  A higher ܾ lowers the optimal size of enterprise and shifts 
the size distribution of enterprises towards smaller sized enterprises.  It could be argued that the 
evolution of technology in the last few decades has been such as to permit operation at lower 
A B C D
ASI Firms 
NSSO Firms with 
10 or employees
NSSO Firms with 
9 employees  NSSO Rest
Number of Firms 143,452                256,993                  67,249                   16,900,000        
Share of Firms 0.8% 1.5% 0.4% 97.3%
Total Employment** 11,500,000          4,543,668               605,245                 29,700,000        
Share of Employment 24.8% 9.8% 1.3% 64.1%
Mean Employment 79.9                       17.7                         9.0                          1.8                       
Median Employment 21                           13                             9                              1                           
Median Labor Productivtiy (Rupees)**** 135,626                59,820                     74,000                   23,400                
* Usage of power is ignored and only the criteria of 10 or more employees is considered for registration under the Factories Act,1948.
   Excludes firms with missng or zero employment.
**Includes unpaid family membes/helpers working in the firm. 
***Capital  here is defined as the value (market value for NSSO and book value for ASI) of assets at the end of the year
****Labor productivity is total gross value added divided by total employment
Firm Categories
Firm Characteristics
Table 1: Compliers, Evaders, Avoiders and Outsiders under the Factories Act, 1948, in 2009‐10*
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scales due to new technologies of production and coordination.  A higher b raises ොܽଷ and thus 
increases B+C+D and total informality as conventionally measured.  It also increases ොܽଵ and thus 
the number of enterprises in category D.  However, the effect on ොܽଶ and thus on B and C is 
ambiguous. 
 
Let us now turn to policy parameters.  One interesting finding of the theory model is that 
the employment level at which the regulation bites is not relevant for the total size of 
informality-- ොܽଷ is independent of መ݈.  The reason for this is that if enforcement is sufficiently 
weak, the relevant choice for firms at the margin is between compliance and non-compliance 
(the latter always dominates adjusting out of the regulation altogether).  The parameters relevant 
for this choice are to do with enforcement, for example the probability of getting caught, not the 
employment level at which the regulation bites.  However, although total informality B+C+D 
does not depend on መ݈, the composition of informality between B, C and D is affected. This is 
because the choice between non-compliance and adjusting out is indeed affected by መ݈. 
Specifically, an increase in መ݈ will increase D and decrease B—the effect on C is ambiguous. 
 
Now consider the effect of the other parameter of regulation, the cost of registration ܿ.  
As this increases, ොܽଷ increases so the total extent of informality increases.  In terms of the 
composition of informality, ොܽଵ and thus D remains unchanged, while ොܽଶ and thus C increases. 
Put simply, when the cost of registration increases, the gain from avoiding increases by this 
amount, but the gain from evading increases by less because of the probability of getting caught 
and having to pay the fine.  The change in the size of B is ambiguous. 
 
An important aspect of policy is regulation of enforcement, captured in the model by the 
probability ݌	of getting caught and, if caught, a fine of ݂ per worker employed.  An increase in 
either ݌	or ݂ will increase ොܽଶ and decrease ොܽଷ while leaving ොܽଵ unchanged.  Thus B+C+D will 
decrease, with D unchanged, B lower and C higher.  The reasoning is that tightening of 
enforcement will encourage more compliance at the margin of compliance and non-compliance, 
but will encourage adjustment out of regulation at the margin of non-compliance and adjustment. 
Thus we have a clear causal account of the link between tighter enforcement and informality—
total informality will decrease as will evasion, but adjustment out of regulation will increase. 
Thus looser enforcement, which is argued by some to be the order of the day, will increase total 
informality and evasion, but reduce adjustment out of informality. 
 
To summarize, the following factors will lead to a higher level total amount of 
informality (B+C+D) as conventionally measured: 
 
 Higher proportion of low productivity enterprises. 
 Higher wage.  
 Lower optimal size of enterprise. 
 Higher private cost of regulation. 
 Lower intensity of enforcement of regulation. 
The previous section showed that there has been trend of increasing, or at least stagnating, rates 
of informality in countries such as India. In terms of general trends, if the past three decades can 
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be characterized as having an improvement in productivity then this factor militates against 
accounting for the increase in informality.  Similarly if it can be argued that the move towards 
deregulation in the decades of liberalization has lowered the private cots of regulation, this factor 
also mitigates against explaining the increase in informality.  However, there are three other 
features of the last three decades which could indeed explain the observed increase in 
informality—a lower intensity of enforcement of regulation, a higher wage, and a lower optimal 
size of enterprise. 
 
The results on the composition of informality are not quite as clear cut, but we do have 
some results: 
 
 The number of outsiders, D, increases with (i) higher proportion of low productivity 
enterprises, (ii) higher employment level at which regulation bites, (iii) higher wage, 
(iv) lower optimal size of enterprise. 
 The number of avoiders or adjusters (C) increases with (i) higher costs of registration, 
(ii) higher intensity of enforcement. 
 The number of evaders (B) increases with (i) lower employment level at which 
regulation bites, (ii) lower intensity of enforcement. 
These specific results on composition will become important when we discuss the consequences 
of informality, and policy responses to address informality, to which we now turn. 
 
4. Consequences 
 Having defined and measured informality, and having identified a range of causes for it, 
we now consider the consequences of informality.  The policy concern with informality flows 
from three broad categories of consequences which can be labeled under two p’s:  productivity 
and poverty5  The broad consensus is that informality is associated with low productivity and 
high poverty, and that addressing these problems requires addressing informality in some form or 
fashion.  The specifics of policy measures will be discussed in the next section.  Here we look in 
greater detail at these two consequences of poverty. 
 
Productivity 
 
 The productivity difference between formality and informality are shown in Table 1 for 
Indian manufacturing.  Taking value added per worker as a measure of productivity, median 
labor productivity is Rs. 135, 626 in category A, but it is Rs. 23,400 in category D, with 
productivity in categories B and C about half way in between. Thus 97.3% of manufacturing 
enterprises in India have an average productivity which is a sixth of the productivity of 0.8% of 
the enterprises which are in the formal sector.  This is a huge difference. If informal enterprises 
could be raised to the productivity of formal enterprises throughout India, output per worker 
would be five times as high, with corresponding consequences for per capita income and 
poverty. 
                                                 
5 There is a third p—public finance or low fiscal base. This is addressed in Kanbur and Keen (2014) and Jutting and 
deLaigleisia (2009) 
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 The gap in productivity between informal and formal enterprises is a global phenomenon. 
For example, Bolio et. al. (2014) highlights the phenomenon in their discussion of “the two 
Mexicos”: 
 
“Mexico’s slow income growth in the past three decades—GDP per capita rose by just 
0.6 percent per year on average and only 0.4 percent during 2013—is due to weak labor 
productivity, which fell from $18.30 per worker per hour (in purchasing power parity) in 1981 to 
$17.90 in 2012…. Behind the productivity averages are two dramatically divergent trends: the 
productivity of large modern enterprises, many of which have become integrated into the global 
economy, has risen by 5.8 percent a year since 1999; in small traditional enterprises, productivity 
is falling by 6.5 percent a year.  In between are mid‑sized companies—a mix of traditional and 
modern establishments whose productivity growth has been close to flat at about 1.0 percent a 
year.  Overall, the gains of modern companies have been all but offset by the decline in 
traditional ones, leaving economy-wide productivity growth at about 0.8 percent a year since 
1990.” (p. 2). 
 
Levy (2008) discusses the Mexico case further, and La Porta and Shleifer (2008) develop the 
argument of informality and low productivity with cross-country exploration: 
 
“Using data from World Bank firm-level surveys, we find that informal firms are small 
and extremely unproductive compared with even the small formal firms in the sample, and 
especially relative to the larger formal firms.  Formal firms are run by much better educated 
managers than informal ones and use more capital, have different customers, market their 
products, and use more external finance.” (p. 1) 
 
 Rodrik (2014) brings the argument up to date by focusing on trends: 
 “Look around the developing world, and you will see a bewildering fissure opening up 
between economies’ leading and lagging sectors.  What is new is not that some firms and 
industries are substantially closer to the global productivity frontier than others.  Productive 
heterogeneity – or what development economists used to call economic dualism – has always 
been a central feature of low-income societies. What is new – and distressing – is that developing 
economies’ low-productivity segments are not shrinking; on the contrary, in many cases, they are 
expanding.”  
Thus Rodrik (2014) brings together the trends identified in Section 2 and the well established 
productivity differences between formal and informal sectors to tell a sobering tale of 
productivity growth being held back in developing countries because of informality. 
 There is, however, a basic question about the association between informality and low 
productivity.  Is low productivity caused by informality, or is informality caused by low 
productivity?  In the model put forward in Section 2, enterprises sort themselves into different 
categories depending on the productivity parameter ܽ.  Those with low ܽ will tend to be 
informal, in the sense of being in categories B, C or D.  Indeed those with lowest productivity, 
15 
 
category D, are not affected at all by the regulation which defines informality.  For them, it is 
low productivity which causes informality.  For Indian manufacturing, this is 97.3% of 
enterprises, employing 64.1% of workers.  Enterprises in categories B and C are affected by the 
regulation, and reduce their size in response.  Now, in the formal model their productivity ܽ is 
unaffected by their size, but it is generally accepted that over time smaller size may have 
deleterious effects on productivity growth.  However, for Indian manufacturing enterprises in 
categories B and C constitute only 1.9% of enterprises, employing 11.1% of workers. 
Poverty 
 Let us turn now to poverty and informality.  Chen (2006) presents a useful decomposition 
of different types of activities in the informal sector which can be related to poverty outcomes.  
In her classification of informality, which takes the broader definition of informality to combine 
informal enterprises and workers in informal jobs, the following segments are identified: 
 Employers 
 Own account operators 
 Employees of informal enterprises 
 Other informal wage workers 
 Industrial outworkers/Homeworkers 
 Unpaid family workers 
Going from top to bottom, incomes range from high through medium to low.  This cautions us 
that not all incomes in the informal sector are low.  There are some in that sector, classified as 
informal because they fall outside state regulation, who might actually be well above the poverty 
line.  However, these are the exception rather than the rule.  In general, informality is associated 
with poverty. 
 
 For India, NCEUS (2007) presents perhaps the most comprehensive assessment of the 
association between informality and poverty.  Bearing in mind the broadening of the definition 
of informality from workers in informal enterprises to include workers in formal enterprises 
without social protection, and the Indian terminology of organized for formal and unorganized 
for informal, Table 2 presents the breakdown of poverty by formality and informality.  The 
overall pattern should be clear and is striking.  The poverty incidence in the unorganized sector is 
close to twice as great as that in the unorganized sector.  The poverty incidence among 
unorganized workers is close to four times that among organized workers. 
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Table 2:  Poverty Incidence By Formality/Informality, India 2004-5 
 Unorganized 
Sector  
% 
Organized 
Sector 
% 
Unorganized 
workers in 
Organized 
Sector 
% 
Unorganized 
workers 
% 
Organized 
workers 
% 
Rural 19.3 12.0 17.0 19.2 5.4 
Urban 25.5 10.7 20.7 25.1 4.5 
All 20.5 11.3 18.7 20.4 4.9 
Source: NCEUS (2007), Table 2.5, p. 24. 
 
 Patterns such as those above are almost universal.  As an illustration, consider the case of 
urban Argentina depicted in Table 3 drawing on the work of Devicienti, Grossman and Poggi 
(2009).  The data show clearly the close association between poverty and informality.  The share 
of informal employment among poor households exceeds the national average, and the incidence 
of poverty is consistently higher when the head of household is informal.  Unlike India, 
Argentina has a panel data which make it possible to explore the relationship between 
informality and poverty over time. The results show significant spillover effects: 
 
“Our results from Argentina show that indeed poverty and informal employment are 
highly persistent processes at the individual level.  Moreover, statistically significant and positive 
spillover effects are found running both from past poverty to current informal employment and 
from past informality to current poverty status, corroborating the view that the two processes are 
also shaped by interrelated dynamics in segmented labor markets.”  (p. 18) 
 
Thus informality causes poverty, and in turn poverty leads to informality.  This informality-
poverty trap has strong policy implications, and needs to be investigated further for India and 
other countries. 
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Table 3:  Informality and Poverty: Urban Argentina 
 
 May 1996 
% 
October 1998 
% 
October 2001 
% 
May 2003 
% 
Informal 
Employment- 
Overall 
49.0 51.7 52.0 51.7 
Informal 
Employment 
Poor- 
Households 
62.5 70.1 71.6 69.9 
Poverty 
Incidence-
Overall 
22.1 21.8 28.3 42.8 
Poverty 
Incidence-
Head of 
Household 
Informal 
25.0 27.2 35.8 54.9 
 Source: Devicienti, Grossman and Poggi (2009), Table 1, p. 22. 
  
 The gender dimensions of informality are prominent in the global policy discourse, 
including in India.  Globally, the recent patterns have been compiled and surveyed in ILO-
WIEGO (2013) and show a varied pattern: 
 
“In 30 of the 41 countries for which data were available by sex, the percentage of women 
in informal non-agricultural employment is higher than that of men…. By contrast, the majority 
of countries have a higher percentage of men than women in informal sector employment…. In 
Latin America and the Caribbean, informal employment is generally a more important source of 
employment for women than for men…. The Eastern Europe and CIS region shows a different 
pattern than the other regions.  The percentages of informal employment and informal sector 
employment are consistently higher for men than for women in the few countries for which data 
were available…. In all Sub-Saharan African countries, for which data were available, the 
percentage of women in informal employment is higher than that of men… In South and East 
Asia, there are fairly similar percentages of men and women having an informal job in all the 
countries with the exception of Sri Lanka.” 
 
Table 4 presents some basic figures showing the importance of women in the informal sector in 
India.  It is seen that of all females in the workforce only 8.9% are regular workers, the 
corresponding number for men is 18.2%.  But a higher percentage of women compared to men 
are in self employment, in casual labor and in unorganized labor.  Most striking is that women 
dominate the homeworkers category, which confirms the ground level observation of 
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organizations like the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA). Here is the story of a bidi-
roller Dipa-ben in Ahmedbabad, as documented in Chen and Doane (2008): 
 
“Dipa-ben, her husband, and their four children – three sons and a daughter – live in what 
used to be the kitchen of her parent-in-laws’ home – a small windowless room. …Each day, 
Dipa-ben and her sister-in-law work together in her sister-in-law’s home, sitting on the floor 
rolling bidis and making paper bags, respectively….Like other women in their Koshti caste, 
Dipa-ben learned to roll bidis (handmade cigarettes) from her mother.  Once a week, she takes a 
bus to get supplies from and deliver finished bidis to a contractor for a large bidi firm….To make 
the bidis, Dipa-ben has to cut the leaves to a fixed size (using a metal pattern), peel the veins off 
the leaves, soak them, fill the leaves with tobacco mix and roll them up, folding the edges in with 
a metal tool, tie each one with thread, and then tie each bundle of ten with thread….Dipa-ben’s 
back often aches as she sits all day on the floor – bent over - to roll bidis.” (pp. 51-52) 
 
Table 4: Gender Dimensions of Informality in India 
 Male  Female 
Work Force Participation Rate 
(%) 
54.7 28.3 
Percentage of Regular 
Workers in Total Workforce 
18.2 8.9 
Percentage of Self-employed 
in Total Workforce 
54.2 61.1 
Percentage of  Casual Labor in 
Total Workforce 
27.5 30.0 
Percentage of Unorganized 
Workers in Total Workforce 
90.7 95.9 
Percentage of Unorganized 
Sector  Workers in Total 
Workforce 
84.0 91.3 
Percentage of Homeworkers 
in Self-Employed 
6.5 30.1 
Source: NCEUS (2007), Table 5.1 p.76 
 
The central point, told by the statistics as well as by the ethnographies, is that in India, as in 
many other countries around the world, the informal sector is an important source of 
employment and income for women.  The gender dimension must thus feature in any policy 
discussion of informality. 
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5. Policy 
 As already noted, informality vexes policy makers. In particular, its continued presence 
and relatively slow decline even in periods of rapid economic growth in countries like India 
seems to go against the basic predictions of development economics.  If informality is the 
“problem” and growth the solution, what is one to do when growth doesn’t seem to be solving 
the problem? 
 
 A partial approach to the dilemma is to be found in the outcome of the simple model 
presented in Section 3.  There it is seen that given the policy parameters and the economic 
fundamentals, enterprises select themselves into categories which we can identify with 
conventional ways of measuring informality.  Category A is clearly the formal sector—those 
who come within the ambit of state regulation and comply.  If the complement of formality is 
informality, then the remaining enterprises are by definition informal.  However, there are three 
categories of informality—the evaders (B), the avoiders (C) and the outsiders (D).  
 
 The key to policymaking in this framework is twofold.  First, to specify objectives such 
as efficiency and equity which transcend informality, so that informality becomes at best an 
intermediate indicator on the consequences of policies.  In this perspective informality and its 
persistence in itself is neither good nor bad—the key is whether and how the evolution of 
informality sheds light on the efficacy of policies for inclusive growth.  Secondly, to the extent 
that informality continues to play a role in the policy discourse, as it surely will given the history 
of development economics, great care should be taken to disaggregate informality into policy 
relevant categories, rather than taking it as an undifferentiated lump and gauging the success of 
policies by measuring impact on the magnitude of this aggregate. 
 
 With this background, and recalling the discussions in Sections 3 and 4, let us focus on a 
range of policies to advance efficiency and equity.  As should be clear from even a cursory 
glance at the policy debate, much of the focus is on enterprise regulation and its efficacy in 
promoting equitable growth.  The debate is sharply divided between those who believe these 
regulations to be inefficient and inequitable, and those who believe them to be necessary to 
correct market failures and protect workers’ wellbeing.  In terms of the categories of the basic 
model in Section 3, this debate centers on enterprises who are in categories B and C, since these 
are the ones who have altered their behavior in response to the regulation.  
 
 However, there is a third party in the policy debate.  These are the policy advocates who 
focus on enterprises in category D—the category for which the regulation is irrelevant.  These 
are the enterprises with low productivity, generating low incomes.  In the view of this third party, 
the debate between “pro-regulation” and “anti-regulation” misses the realty of the lives of those 
who earn their living from outside the domain in which the regulation bites.  As shown in 
Section 4, in India this category account for 97% of all enterprises and 64% of all employment in 
manufacturing.  Raising the productivity of these enterprises and the incomes of those working 
in it merits as much attention as the more vocal debates on regulation and deregulation.  In this 
section we will first of all consider the regulation debate and then move to the equally important 
and large number who fall into the category D—the “outsiders.” 
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Regulation and Informality 
 
 Following the model of Section 3, regulation leads to evasion and avoidance.  Enterprises 
in categories B and C are smaller than they would otherwise be because of regulation.  Output is 
lower and if this was the end of the matter the conclusion would be quite stark.  Relative to the 
no regulation equilibrium output is lower overall and some enterprises are smaller, with perhaps 
dynamic effects on future output and productivity.  Indeed, this is how the sharpest arguments in 
favor of deregulation are often put.  
 
 There is significant evidence that regulations do indeed have an effect on enterprise size. 
This is particularly true, as might be expected, of size-dependent regulations.  There are strong 
efficiency effects since those who adjust out of the regulations are dramatically smaller than their 
productivity would warrant.  One can further introduce general equilibrium effects by solving for 
the wage in labor market equilibrium.  If the fall in labor demand leads to a lower wage then 
there is a further effect as lower ability individuals are pulled into entrepreneurship, again 
relative to the no regulation equilibrium. Garicano, Le Large and Van Reenen (2013) apply this 
framework to France, where labor laws bite when firm size exceeds 50 workers.  They find that 
with flexible wages the one-off effect of regulation is equivalent to a loss of 1% of GDP.  When 
wages are inflexible the loss climbs to 5% of GDP. Gourio and Roys (2012) extend the empirical 
framework to the dynamic setting of Lucas (1978).  Their study captures the spirit of much of the 
analysis in this literature: 
 
“In France, firms with 50 employees or more face substantially more regulation than 
firms with less than 50.  As a result, the size distribution of firms is visibly distorted: there are 
many firms with exactly 49 employees.  We model the regulation as the combination of a sunk 
cost that must be paid the first time the firm reaches 50 employees, and a payroll tax that is paid 
each period thereafter when the firm operates with more than 50 employees….The key finding is 
that the regulation is equivalent to a combination of a sunk cost approximately equal to about one 
year of an average employee salary, and a small payroll tax of 0.04%....Removing the regulation 
improves labor allocation across firms, leading in steady-state to an increase in output per worker 
slightly less than 0.3%, holding the number of firms fixed.  However, if firm entry is elastic, the 
steady-state gains are an order of magnitude smaller.” 
 
Similar simulation exercises have been done for other countries.  Using a two sector model with 
manufacturing and agriculture for India, with a focus on removing size-dependent regulations in 
manufacturing, Cai and Pandey (2013) find that:  
 
 “Labor regulations increase the cost of hiring labor for larger establishments and have 
been cited as the reason for the “missing middle” in Indian manufacturing.  Using data for India, 
we calibrate a two-sector model in which agents differ in their managerial abilities and 
successfully generate this “missing middle”.  We use the model to undertake a counterfactual 
exercise where we remove the labor regulations and evaluate the changes.  We find that 
removing the regulations leads to reallocation of labor and capital, and results in a 2.3% increase 
in GDP per worker.  We find that the increase in real output per worker is in fact higher in 
agriculture (2.8%) than in manufacturing (0.7%).  The gain in labor productivity in agriculture is 
accounted for mostly by the increase in capital allocation for the sector.” 
21 
 
General equilibrium studies such as the one by Cai and Pandey (2013) complement cross-
sectional studies like that by Besley and Burgess (2004) which find a negative impact of 
regulations on growth across states of India (see also, for example, Box 2.4 of Government of 
India, 2013). 
 
One feature that stands out from the studies by Gourio and Roys (2012) and Cai and 
Pandey (2013) is the relatively small impact of size dependent regulations on overall 
productivity.  In France complete and total removal of the regulation leads to an increase in 
output per worker of only 0.3%, and a much lower figure over the long run.  For India, there is a 
2.3% static once for all gain in output per worker, and only a 0.7% gain for manufacturing. The 
numbers for India can also be seen through the prism of our Table 1, which presents median 
employment size and median labor productivity for each category of enterprise.  Let us for this 
argument treat these as means in order to take out the effects of outliers.  Only 12% of workers 
are employed by workers in categories C and D.  So if the removal of the Factories Act 
magically transformed these into workers with twice the productivity, the same as that of 
workers in category A, then overall productivity would experience a once for all increase of 
around 6%.  But this is clearly an overestimate because naturally productive enterprises are 
selected into category A according to our model.  A full calibration of the counterfactual is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but a number less than 3% seems plausible.  The general point 
for countries like India is that much of the weight of low productivity comes from that part of the 
size distribution of enterprises which is not affected by regulation at all.  A different set of 
policies need to be formulated for this part of the informal economy. 
 
Before turning to category D—the outsiders—note that the two studies quoted above, in 
common with most studies of this type, only analyze the cost side of the regulation.  But is there 
no benefit to regulation at all?  What of the benefits to workers of better health and safety if that 
is the nature of the regulation?  Surely this must be accounted for before a final assessment can 
be made?  Such an analysis is conducted by Kanbur and Keen (2014) in the context of taxation 
and informality, where the tax and revenue interpretation facilitates direct comparison with 
standard pubic finance methods and perspectives.  It is shown, for example, that an optimal 
policy, one which balances out the losses from incentive effects and the revenue gains from those 
in the tax threshold, will in general still have positive taxation and a positive threshold.  
 
The analogy in our case is to take into account the benefits to workers from regulated 
enterprises.  Health and safety and worker benefits are not explicitly modeled in Section 3, but 
we do have the registration cost ܿ.  This can be thought of as accruing to the government as 
revenue and its social value must be accounted for, either as government revenue per se or as 
reflecting the benefit to workers of the regulation.  To illustrate the argument, let us take the case 
where enforcement is so good (݌݂ is so high) that category B disappears leaving only category C 
( ොܽଵ ൌ 	 ොܽଶ ).  Then the government raises an amount c from all those with ܽ	 ൒ 	 ොܽଷ	, but the 
economy loses output for enterprises between ොܽଵ and ොܽଷ.  The analogous argument to that in 
Kanbur and Keen (2014) would then be that the optimal level of ܿ is not zero i.e. no regulation is 
not optimal, even taking into account the costs on output and efficiency. 
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Promoting the Outsiders 
 
 Even if significant deregulation took place, for example if the fixed or marginal costs of 
registration were reduced, this would leave unchanged the production conditions of those to 
whom the regulation does not apply.  In the model, these are enterprises with employment less 
than መ݈.  In the empirical analysis of Table 1, these are the 97.3% of all enterprises in Indian 
manufacturing.  And, putting a face on the theory and the numbers, these include own account 
workers like the bidi-roller Dipa-ben, whose story was told in Section 4.  Interestingly, if the 
regulation was relaxed in the sense of raising መ݈, the number of outsiders would only increase! 
Deregulation of enterprises does not seem to be the answer to low incomes and productivity in 
this (huge) section of economic activity. 
 
The answer, rather, is to employ direct methods and interventions to address low 
productivity in these enterprises.  Own account workers like Dipa-ben, who constitute one 
worker enterprises (note from Table 1 that the median size of enterprise in category D is 1 
worker), have low incomes because their productivity is low and because their bargaining power 
is low vis-a-vis the contractors and sub-contracts to whom they sell their output.  These are the 
factors which need to be addressed by policy makers if they wish to address the “problem” of 
informality. 
 
 There are many dimensions of improvement of productivity and incomes in small scale 
enterprises, including skill enhancing training, access to infrastructure, improving technology 
and improving access to credit in order to permit acquisition of new technology and expansion of 
operations.  Of these, access to formal credit at reasonable terms is also important not only for 
enterprises in the informal sector, but for the poor in the informal economy as individuals 
managing their personal finances against a series of shocks.  Our discussion here will focus 
primarily on credit. 
 
 An initial insight into the issues of credit for informal sector enterprises and workers can 
be got through looking at the background and objectives of the SEWA Bank: 
 “Self- employed women workers are caught in the vicious circle of poverty; of 
indebtedness, assetlessness, and low-income levels.  A possible solution to free these women 
from this vicious circle was by directly linking them with the nationalised banks.  But the formal 
sector institutions were unable to meet the financial needs of women workers adequately for a 
number of reasons.  These included complicated forms, which were largely inaccessible to 
illiterate women, need for high levels of collateral to get credit… Women workers, especially 
those in the informal sector-have been largely bypassed by the formal banking institutions. 
However, they are economically active, and have distinct expenditure patterns, depending upon 
their trade or work, their family situation and their socio -economic conditions. SEWA Bank 
relies on an intimate knowledge of its client's expenditure patterns, in order to develop 
appropriate products and services.”6 
                                                 
6 http://www.sewabank.com/introduction.html 
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The same introduction could be written for much of the non-formal banking system in India 
which caters to the informal economy. 
 
 There is, of course, a huge literature on lack of access to credit to the poor in developing 
countries, including in India.  Innovative micro banking institutions such as the Grameen Bank 
or the SEWA Bank have been written about extensively, and analyzed.  This is not the occasion 
to review this vast literature.  Rather, the focus here is on what policymakers can do, and indeed 
on how policy is holding back the development of credit to the informal sector and informal 
workers. 
 
 In India, there has been a huge expansion of formal bank branches in previously 
unbanked areas, pushed by a policy of priority sector lending with associated carrots and sticks. 
There is considerable academic debate on the impact of this expansion, particularly on poverty. 
Thus Burgess and Pande (2005), focusing on rural bank branch expansion, conclude that:  
 
“Evaluated at the sample mean, we find that rural branch expansion can explain a 14 to 
17 percentage point decline in rural headcount— roughly half the overall fall across the period.” 
(p. 793). 
 
This conclusion is confirmed in Burgess, Pande and Wong (2005).  However, just to show the 
difficulties in establishing such findings convincingly, here is how Panagariya (2006) critiques 
their findings drawing on the work of Kochar (2005): 
 
“Kochar (2005, p. 2) raises serious questions about the identification strategy of Burgess 
and Pande arguing that ‘it is flawed because the expansion of the banking network during this 
period went hand-in-hand with the government’s broader anti-poverty programs, including the 
IRDP, making it impossible to distinguish the effect of the expansion of the banking network 
from that of government subsidies and other IRDP inputs.’  Kochar also presents evidence 
showing a close correlation between the real total expenditures on the IRDP and the expansion of 
the banking infrastructure between 1980 and 1990.” (p. 9) 
 
The econometric doubts expressed by Panagariya (2006) and Kochar (2005) also resonate with 
the more ground level perspective of SEWA Bank noted above, that “formal sector institutions 
were unable to meet the financial needs of women workers adequately.”  There is also of course 
the question of whether the cost of bank expansion was worth the purported benefits. 
 
 If the expansion of formal banks, whether private or state owned, is not necessarily the 
whole answer, then could the expansion of microbanking providing microfinance be an avenue 
for policy makers?  Once again, there is a huge literature on this which it would be impossible to 
survey here.  But it is instructive to look at two surveys (Morduch, 1999; Bannerjee, 2013) over a 
span of a decade and a half to see how the evidence and the reading of the evidence has changed, 
if at all. Morduch (1999) reached a sober conclusion fifteen years ago: 
 
“The microfinance movement has made inroads around the world.  In the process, poor 
households are being given hope and the possibility to improve their lives through their own 
labor.  But the “win-win” rhetoric promising poverty alleviation with profits has moved far 
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ahead of the evidence…Most important, all else the same it remains far more costly to lend small 
amounts of money to many people than to lend large amounts to a few.  As a result, the programs 
are highly cost-sensitive, and most rely on subsidies.  Some observers speculate that if subsidies 
are pulled and costs cannot be reduced, as many as 95 percent of current programs will 
eventually have to close shop.” (pp. 1609-1610).” 
 
A decade and a half later, based on a wealth of additional micro level evidence, Bannerjee (2013) 
summarizes his overview as follows: 
 
“Taking this body of work together, some patterns stand out.  First, there is clear 
evidence that as long as the credit is reasonably priced, it leads to business creation and/or some 
amount of expansion. …..Most studies also see an increase in ownership of consumer durables 
and business assets, especially if home repair and livestock ownership (both of which provide 
services into the future) count as durables….What is also striking is the lack of strong evidence 
linking this business creation to increases in consumption….There is also no evidence of 
substantial gains along other dimensions of welfare, such as education and health.  At least in the 
one- to three-year horizon, we see no evidence of microcredit transforming the lives of its 
beneficiaries.” (p. 508). 
 
Thus it might be argued that at least from the point of view of rigorous academic evidence there 
is a strong note of caution of how much microcredit by itself can do to increase productivity of 
small scale enterprises. 
 
 However, further discussion in Bannerjee (2013) on what the evidence says about why 
the impact of credit is so limited might in turn provide roads to other types of policy action. 
Bannerjee (2013) reads the evidence to reject the argument that microcredit borrowers are simply 
not credit constrained.  But, give this, there are two types of reasons why microcredit in practice 
does not turn out to be as productive as might be expected and hoped—the structure of 
microcredit loans, and the capacity of microcredit borrowers to use them productively.  
 
First, the structure and size of loans may not be appropriate to generate productive 
returns.  Even for micro enterprises, if investment is needed at a certain minimum scale (albeit 
small) before a project pays off, then if the micro credit is too micro it will not lead to a 
productive outcome.  Similarly, if the maturity structure is too short term and too inflexible in the 
face of shocks, this may inhibit investment in viable projects. Indeed, the loan size and maturity 
structure may align more with borrowing for consumption rather than investment, which matches 
the evidence which has accumulated over the last decade and a half. 
 
Second, microcredit borrowers may not have the desire to start an enterprise or the 
capacity to fully utilize the loan to productive end even if they have the intent.  Bannerjee and 
Duflo (2011) report the results of a survey in India that asks parents their aspirations for their 
children—none mentioned starting a business.  But many may also lack the background and 
training to enter into running and managing an enterprise, especially one which would have to 
interact with the formal world as it grows, even if it remains small and informal.  In this context 
it is interesting to note that microbanks like SEWA Bank who claim to be successful in helping 
their borrowers start productive enterprises pride themselves on being able to tailor the loans to 
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individual circumstances rather provide a single-size-fits-all package.  Further, SEWA Bank and 
the parent organization SEWA also pride themselves in providing a range of appropriate 
financial and occupational training for their members. 
 
These two dimensions of successful microcredit to the informal sector and the informal 
economy—tailored products and training—can help to frame a policy discourse.  While formal 
banks can provide loans and other services at a larger scale, they do not seem to be able to get 
beyond standardized products which cater to those with regular sources of income or those with 
sufficient collateral to minimize risks.  Microfinance institutions, at least some of them, do tailor 
their products to the particular income flows and expenditure patterns of their informal sector 
clients, but do not appear to be able to operate at a large enough scale to have significant impact 
at a national level. 
 
At the same time, many of the regulations on formal banking, valid as they might be in 
terms of a world that is wholly formal, impose severe restrictions on those in the informal 
economy.  Among these are variations on “know your customer” (KYC) requirements, which 
include the requirement to produce forms of identification which are easy to obtain in formal 
sector jobs, but not so easy in the informal economy.  Thus, for example, documents such as 
utility bills to establish proof of residence may be impossible to get for those living in slum 
conditions, where the landlord has one meter but many tenants.  Such requirements are in place 
the world over, reflections of a “mindset” in officialdom which is itself formal in nature (Kanbur 
2014).  To its credit, the Reserve Bank of India has recognized the problem as it has modified the 
requirements to make it more possible for smaller scale savers to open bank accounts, for 
example to allow NREGA cards to be used for identification, as well as Aadhar cards (“if the 
address provided by the account holder is the same as that on Aadhaar letter, it may be accepted 
as a proof of both identity and address.”7)  
 
 Although beyond the scope of this paper to address or assess in detail, the spirit of the 
basic model of the link between low productivity and informality in Section 3 also permeates the 
recommendations of the financial inclusion part of the Rajan Commission report on Financial 
Sector Reforms (Planning Commission, 2009).  Relevant to our discussion is their Proposal 3--
“Allow more entry to private well-governed deposit-taking small finance banks…” (p. 7); 
Proposal 4—“Liberalize the banking correspondent regulation so that a wide range of local 
agents can serve to extend financial services.” (p. 8); Proposal 5:  Offer priority sector loan 
certificates (PSLC) to all entities that lend to eligible categories in the priority sector.  Allow 
banks that undershoot their priority sector obligations to buy the PSLC and submit it towards 
fulfillment of their target.” (p. 8); and Proposal 6:  “Liberalize the interest rate 
that institutions can charge, ensuring credit reaches the poor…” (p. 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Paragraph 2.6Bd, RBI KYC Master Circular dated Jul 1, 2013, RBI/2013‐14/94 DBOD. AML. BC. No. 24/14.01.001/2013‐14 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Let us return to the questions posed in the introduction.  What exactly is informality and 
what are its magnitudes and trends?  What are the causes of informality and why is it not 
decreasing as predicted by standard theories of development?  What are the consequences for 
inclusive economic growth of a large and increasing informal sector?  What are feasible and 
desirable policy responses to informality?  This paper attempts to provide answers these 
questions, based on a review of research on India and globally. 
 
 There are myriad conceptualizations of informality in the literature, and associated 
approaches to measurement.  However, a possible unifying strand is one which relates formality 
as that which comes within the purview of state laws and regulation, and informality as that 
which lies outside.  Applying this broad approach to national statistical measurement, more than 
80% of the Indian workforce is informal, and this ratio has hardly budged in the last twenty 
years, despite a period of remarkable growth by historical standards.  Although levels of 
informality differ across the world ranging from lows in Latin America to highs in Africa and in 
South Asia, and although there are variations in across countries in trends, there is no uniform 
trend of decreasing informality, as would be predicted by standard development theories.  It 
would appear that informality will be with us for a while. 
 
 An exploration into the causes of informality leads one away from informality as a 
uniform category, and towards an appreciation of disaggregated categories of informality. 
Starting with the basic conceptualization of formality and informality as being relative to state 
regulation, the model of Section 3 leads to a disaggregation into formal (A), and three categories 
of informality—those who evade regulation (B), those who avoid regulation (C) and those to 
whom the regulation does not apply (D).  The paper presents an empirical breakdown of these 
categories for India, but as important is the appreciation that economic forces and policy 
parameters impact differently on the different categories.  Thus an explanation for the non-
decline of informality can be sought in factors such as regulation (although there has been 
deregulation during the period that informality has increased), higher wages through 
development (which may incentivize smaller scale enterprises, ceteris paribus), or evolution of 
technology if it makes smaller enterprises more viable than before. 
 
 The consequences of informality are by now well understood and documented. 
Informality is closely associated with poverty, in India and the world over.  It is also associated 
with low productivity, but the causal direction is less clear.  Informality in categories B and C is 
associated with enterprises smaller than they would be otherwise, with associated loss in output 
and perhaps dynamic posses in productivity growth.  Here it is enterprise response to regulation 
which is leading to informality.  By contrast, category D is also associated with low productivity, 
but here the regulation is irrelevant—it is low productivity which leads to informality as 
measured.  
 
 The causal chains discussed above are important for policy, and perhaps help explain the 
disconnect between those who focus on deregulation as the major policy response to informality, 
and those who focus on direct productivity enhancing interventions as the needed policy 
response.  In terms of our classification, the first group is directing attention to categories B and 
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C of informality, while the second group is directing attention to category D.  There is significant 
evidence that regulation does indeed have efficiency costs and this should be taken on board in 
the policy discourse, although the focus of the literature is almost exclusively on the costs of 
regulation with little discussion of the benefits side of the equation.  On category D, the 
outsiders, we have discussed credit related interventions, in particular policies which emphasize 
financial inclusion for those who are excluded from formal banking.  This must surely be a major 
plan in any policy to address the informality which looks like it will be with us for some time to 
come.  
28 
 
References 
 
Bannerjee, Abhijit. 2013. “Microcredit Under the Microscope: What Have We Learned in the 
Past Two Decades, and What Do We Need to Know?”  Annual Review of Economics, 
Vol. 5, pp 487-519. 
 
Bannerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. 2011. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to 
Fight Global Poverty. New York:  Public Affairs. 
 
Besley, T., & Burgess, R. (2004). Can labor regulation hinder economic performance? Evidence 
from India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 91–134. 
 
Boeke, Julius H. 1953. Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by 
Indonesia. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 
 
Burgess, Robin and Rohini Pande. 2005. “"Can Rural Banks Reduce Poverty? Evidence from the 
Indian Social Banking Experiment," American Economic Review Vol. 95 (3), pp. 780-
795. 
 
Burgess, Robin and Rohini Pande and Grace Wong, 2005, “Banking for the Poor: Evidence from 
India” Journal of European Economic Association Vol. 3, pp 268-78. 
 
Bolio, Eduardo, Jaana Remes, Tomás Lajous, James Manyika, Eugenia Ramirez, and Morten 
Rossé. 2014. “A tale of two Mexicos: Growth and prosperity in a two-speed economy.” 
McKinsey Global Institute. 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/americas/a_tale_of_two_mexicos  
 
Cai, Wenbiao and Manish Pandey. 2013. “Size-Dependent Regulations and Structural Transformation 
in India.” Economics Letters, Vol. 119, pp 272-275. 
 
Charmes, Jacques. 2009. “Concepts, Measurement and Trends.” In Jutting, Johannes P. and Juan 
R. de Laiglesia (Editors). 2009. Is Informal Normal? Towards More and Better Jobs In 
Developing Countries. OECD, ISBN: 978-92-64-05923-8. 
http://www.oecd.org/inclusive-growth/Is%20Informal%20Normal%20Towards%20 
More%20and%20Better%20Jobs%20in%20Developing%20Countries%20.pdf  
 
Chatterjee, Urmila and Ravi Kanbur. 2013. “Regulation and Non-Compliance: Magnitudes and 
Patterns for India’s Factories Act.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
6755. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/ 
2014/01/23/000158349_20140123104008/Rendered/PDF/WPS6755.pdf  
 
Chen, Martha. 2006. “Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy 
and the Formal Regulatory Environment.” In Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb, Ravi Kanbur 
and Elinor Ostrom. 2006. “Beyond Formality and Informality,” in Basudeb Guha-
Khasnobis, Ravi Kanbur and Elinor Ostrom (eds.), Linking the Formal and Informal 
Economy: Concepts and Policies. Oxford University Press. 
29 
 
 
Chen, Martha and Donna Doane. 2008. “Informality in South Asia: A Review.” WIEGO 
Working Paper No. 4. http://wiego.org/sites/wiego.org/files/publications/files/Chen_ 
WIEGO_WP4.pdf  
 
De Paula, Aureo, and Jose J. Scheinkman. 2007. “The Informal Sector,” NBER Working Paper 
No. 13486. http://www.nber.org/papers/w13486.pdf  
 
Devicienti, Francesco, Fernando Groisman and Ambra Poggi. 2009. “Informality and poverty: 
Are these processes dynamically interrelated? Evidence from Argentina.” ECINEQ 
Working Paper No. 2009-146. http://www.ecineq.org/milano/WP/ECINEQ2009-146.pdf  
 
Garicano, Luis, Claire LeLarge and John Van Reenen. 2013. “Firm Size Distortions and the 
Productivity Distribution:  Evidence from France.” NBER Working Paper No. 18841 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18841  
 
Ghani, Ejaz, William R. Kerr and Stephen D. O’Connell. 2013. “The Exceptional Persistence of 
India’s Unorganized Sector.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6454. 
 
Gourio, Francois and Nicolas A. Roys. 2012. “Size-Dependent Regulations, Firm Size 
Distribution, and Reallocation.” NBER Working Paper No. 18657. 
 
Government of India. 2013. Economic Survey 2012-2013. 
http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/budget2013-2014/survey.asp  
 
Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb, Ravi Kanbur and Elinor Ostrom. 2006. “Beyond Formality and 
Informality,” in Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis, Ravi Kanbur and Elinor Ostrom (eds.), 
Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies. Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Hart, Keith. 1973. “Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana.” Journal 
of Modern African Studies 11 (1): 61–89. 
 
Hart, Keith. 2006. “Bureaucratic Form and the Informal Economy.” In Linking the Formal and 
Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies, eds. Basudeb Guha‐Khasnobis, Ravi Kanbur, 
and Elinor Ostrom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
ICLS. 2003. Seventeenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians: Main Report. 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/17thicls/r1gen.pdf Accesses 28 
October, 2010. 
 
ILO-WIEGO. 2013. Women and Men in the Informal Economy, Second Edition. 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/publication/ 
wcms_234413.pdf  
 
30 
 
Jutting, Johannes P. and Juan R. de Laiglesia (Editors). 2009. Is Informal Normal? Towards 
More and Better Jobs In Developing Countries. OECD, ISBN: 978-92-64-05923-8. 
http://www.oecd.org/inclusive-growth/Is%20Informal%20Normal%20Towards%20 
More%20and%20Better%20Jobs%20in%20Developing%20Countries%20.pdf  
 
Kanbur, Ravi. 2014. “Informality: Mindsets and Policies.” In Bimal Jalan and Pulapre 
Balakrishnan (eds.) Politics Trumps Economics.  Rupa Publications.  Forthcoming. 
 
Kanbur, Ravi and Michael Keen. “Thresholds, Informality and Partitions of Compliance.” Dyson 
Working Paper, Cornell University, No. 2014-11. 
http://dyson.cornell.edu/research/researchpdf/wp/2014/Cornell-Dyson-wp1411.pdf  
 
Kochar, Anjini, 2005, “Social Banking and Poverty:  A Micro-empirical Analysis of the Indian 
Experience,” Stanford Center for International Development, Stanford University, 
 
La Porta, Rafael, and Andrei Shleifer. 2008. “The Unofficial Economy and Economic 
Development” (with R. La Porta), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall, pp. 
 275-352. 
 
Lucas, R. E. (1978). On the Size Distribution of Business Firms. The Bell Journal of Economics, 
9(2): 508. 
 
Morduch, Jonathan. 1999. “The Microfinance Promise.” Journal of Economic Literature. 
Volume 37, pp. 1569-1614. 
 
NCEUS. 2007. Report on Conditions of Work and Promotion of Livelihoods in the Unorganised 
Sector. http://nceuis.nic.in/Condition_of_workers_sep_2007.pdf 
 
NCEUS. 2009. The Challenge of Employment in India, An Informal Economy Perspective;  
Volume I: Main Report.http://nceuis.nic.in/The_Challenge_of_Employment_in_India.pdf 
 
Panagariya, Arvind. 2006. “Bank Branch Expansion and Poverty Reduction: A Comment.” 
http://www.columbia.edu/~ap2231/technical%20papers/Bank%20Branch%20Expansion
%20and%20Poverty.pdf  
 
Planning Commission, Government of India. 2009. A Hundred Small Steps:  Report of the 
Committee on Financial Sector Reforms. New Delhi:  Sage. 
 
Rodrik, Dani. 2014. “The Growing Divide Within developing Economies.” Project Syndicate. 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dani-rodrik-examines-why-informal-and-
traditional-sectors-are-expanding--rather-than-shrinking  
 
 
WP No Title Author(s)
OTHER A.E.M. WORKING PAPERS
Fee
(if applicable)
How Useful is Inequality of Opportunity as a
Policy-Construct?
Kanbur, R. and A. Wagstaff2014-17
The Salience of Excise vs. Sales Taxes on
Healthy Eating: An Experimental Study
Chen, X., Kaiser, H. and B. Rickard2014-16
'Local' producer's production functions and
their importance in estimating economic
impacts
Jablonski, B.B.R. and T.M. Schmit2014-15
Rising Inequality in Asia and Policy
Implications
Zhuang, J., Kanbur, R. and C. Rhee2014-14
Heterogeneous firms and informality: the
effects of trade liberalization on labor markets
Becker, D.2014-13
Minimum Wage Effects at Different
Enforcement Levels: Evidence from
Employment Surveys in India
Soundararajan.V.2014-12
Thresholds, Informality, and Partitions of
Compliance
Kanbur, R. and M. Keen2014-11
On the Political Economy of Guest Workers
Programs in Agriculture
Richard, B.2014-10
Groupings and the Gains from Tagging Kanbur, R. and M. Tuomala2014-09
Economic Policy in South Africa:  Past,
Present, and Future
Bhorat, H., Hirsch, A., Kanbur, R. and M.
Ncube
2014-08
The Economics of China:  Successes and
Challenges
Fan, S., Kanbur, R., Wei, S. and X.
Zhang
2014-07
Mindsets, Trends and the Informal Economy Kanbur, R.2014-06
Regulation and Non-Compliance:  Magnitudes
and Patterns for India’s Factories Act
Chatterjee, U. and R. Kanbur2014-05
Urbanization and Agglomeration Benefits:
Gender Differentiated Impacts on Enterprise
Creation in India’s Information Sector
Ghani, E., Kanbur, R. and S. O'Connell2014-04
Globalization and Inequality Kanbur, R.2014-03
Paper copies are being replaced by electronic Portable Document Files (PDFs). To request PDFs of AEM publications, write to (be sure to
include your e-mail address):  Publications, Department of  Applied Economics and Management, Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
14853-7801.  If a fee is indicated, please include a check or money order made payable to Cornell University for the amount of your
purchase.  Visit our Web site  (http://dyson.cornell.edu/research/wp.php) for a more complete list of recent bulletins.
